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Abstract. An interesting consequence of the modern cosmological paradigm is the spatial infinity 
of the universe. When coupled with naturalistic understanding of the origin of life and intelligence, 
which follows the basic tenets of astrobiology, and with  some fairly incontroversial assumptions 
in the theory of observation selection effects, this infinity leads, as Ken Olum has recently shown, 
to a paradoxical conclusion. Olum's paradox is related, to the famous Fermi's paradox in 
astrobiology and SETI studies. We, hereby, present an evolutionary argument countering the 
apparent inconsistency, and show how, in the framework of a simplified model, deeper picture of 
the coupling between histories of intelligent/technological civilizations and astrophysical evolution 
of the Galaxy, can be achieved. This strategy has consequences of importance for both 
astrobiological studies and philosophy. 
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1. The problem 
 
We are lucky enough to live in an epoch of great progress in the nascent discipline of 
astrobiology, which deals with three canonical questions: How does life begin and 
develop? Does life exist elsewhere in the universe? What is the future of life on Earth and 
in space? A host of important discoveries has been made during the last decade or so, the 
most important certainly being a discovery of a large number of extrasolar planets; the 
existence of many extremophile organisms possibly comprising “deep hot biosphere” of 
Thomas Gold; the discovery of subsurface water on Mars and the huge ocean on Europa, 
and possibly also Ganymede and Callisto; the unequivocal discovery of amino-acids and 
other complex organic compounds in meteorites; modelling organic chemistry in Titan’s 
atmosphere; the quantitative treatment of the Galactic habitable zone; the development of 
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a new generation of panspermia theories, spurred by experimental verification that even 
terrestrial microorganisms easily survive conditions of an asteroidal or a cometary impact; 
progress in methodology of SETI studies, etc. (for recent beautiful reviews see Des Marais 
and Walter 1999; Darling 2001; Grinspoon 2003). However, the epistemological and 
methodological basis of astrobiological and SETI studies presents us with a hornet's nest 
of issues which have not been, with few exceptions, tackled in the literature so far. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that seemingly paradoxical situations and conclusions arise from 
time to time, as is usual in young scientific fields.  
For instance, in assessing the importance and future ramification of these 
discoveries, we obviously take into account our properties as intelligent observers, as well 
as physical, chemical and other pre-conditions necessary for our existence. The latter are 
topics of the so-called anthropic reasoning, the subject of much debate and controversy in 
cosmology, fundamental physics, and philosophy of science. In recent years it became 
clear that anthropic principle(s) can be most fruitfully construed as observation selection 
effects (Bostrom 2002). This is a straightforward continuation of the Copernican 
worldview, which emphasizes a non-special character of our cosmic habitat, and which 
has so immensely contributed to our scientific understanding.  
In a recent elegant and thought-provoking paper, Olum (2004) argues that “a 
straightforward application of anthropic reasoning and reasonable assumptions about the 
capabilities of other civilizations predicts that we should be part of a large civilization 
spanning our galaxy.” Starting from the assumption of an infinite universe (following from 
the inflationary paradigm), Olum conjectures that there are civilizations much larger (that 
is, consisting of much greater number of observers, say 1019) than ours (about 1010 
observers). Now, even if 90% of all existing civilizations are small ones similar to our 
own, anthropic reasoning suggests that the overwhelming probabilistic prediction is that 
we live in a large civilization. Since this prediction is spectacularly unsuccessful on 
empirical grounds; with a probability of such failure being about 10-8, something is clearly 
wrong here.  
We shall refer to the alleged incompatibility of anthropic reasoning with 
observations as “Olum’s problem”. In a less refined manner, it has been foreseen by J. 
Richard Gott (in a founding paper in Nature on the “Doomsday Argument”; Gott 1993): 
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In the limit where (cosmology permitting) a supercivilization is able to 
accumulate an infinite amount of elapsed conscious time and an infinite 
number of intelligent observers..., the fraction of ordinary civilizations such as 
ours that will develop into such a supercivilization must go to zero so that the 
set of observers born on the original home planet is not an infinitesimal 
minority of all intelligent observers. 
 
However, the cosmological background has not been so clear at the time of Gott’s paper, 
so a finite universe still was a rather widely accepted option. Recent results (in particular 
those of WMAP; Bennett et al. 2003; Schwarz and Terrero-Escalante 2004) have strongly 
confirmed predictions of the inflationary paradigm, which is generically eternal and faces 
us with strong form of Olum’s problem. The same applies even more forcefully to 
cosmologies following from M-theory (e.g., Billyard et al. 2000). In all these cases, we 
face an infinite universe with all philosophical conundrums infinities have traditionally 
presented us with; moreover, new problems, such as Olum’s, are bound to arise.  
Olum proceeds to give several possible solutions (conveniently labeled as 
subsections of his section 2) to the problem why we don't find ourselves members of a 
large civilization: 
 
2.1.  anthropic reasoning doesn’t work; 
2.2.  anthropic reasoning should use civilizations instead of individuals; 
2.3.  one should consider observers who live at any time; 
2.4.  selection biases; 
2.5.  infinitesimally few civilizations become large;  
2.6.  the universe is not infinitely large; 
2.7.  colonization of the Galaxy is impossible;  
2.8.  we are a “lost colony” of a large civilization; 
2.9.  the idea of individual will be different in the future;  
 
admitting that none of them are very likely, but maybe  
 
2.10. some combination of them might work to alleviate the problem.  
 4
 
In this note, we advance a proposal for the general solution which escapes Olum’s 
analysis, although it has some connection with several of his proposals. Let us start with 
three auxiliary comments. 
 
 
2. Comments  
 
(I) Fermi’s paradox as a boundary condition. Olum’s problem, as formulated 
above, can be seen as a generalised version of the well-known Fermi’s paradox in 
astrobiology: why aren’t extraterrestrials here, when they have had so much time to come 
to us? It is easy to see how the two are related: suppose that you define a civilization(*) as 
“all those intelligent observers who are in contact at present”. At present, humans are only 
in contact with other humans. Thus, it makes sense to ask the problematic question: how 
do we find ourselves belonging to a small civilization(*)? If we are to be contacted by a 
large alien civilization, then our civilization(*) will be suddenly enlarged, so the 
corresponding Bayesian probability will increase. A large amount of literature exists on 
Fermi’s paradox (e.g., Brin 1983; Webb 2002); some of the solutions proposed have 
generalisations applicable to this case, most notably the idea, believed by scientists such as 
Sagan or von Hoerner, that most civilizations destroy themselves upon discovering nuclear 
power or a similar risky technology. While we certainly should not be surprised that our 
civilization has managed (so far!) to escape destruction through nuclear war/winter, it is 
obvious that there is nothing non-exclusive about this: it is perfectly plausible that some 
civilizations escape these suicidal temptations. Another approach is the one of Annis 
(1999), invoking a global (in this instance, galactic) regulation mechanism, resetting local 
“astrobiological clocks” from time to time, and thus introducing correlation into a priori 
chaotic timescales of civilization development. This approach can be further developed 
and influence our practical considerations vis-à-vis feasibility of SETI projects, which is 
shown in Ćirković (2004). We have to keep in mind that, in most cases, successful 
solution of Olum’s problem will enable us to resolve Fermi’s paradox as well. That this is 
not exclusively so, testifies Olum’s solution 2.9 (“large civilizations may consist of a small 
number of individuals”), which does not help us with Fermi’s paradox; but this is an 
exceptional case.  
 5
Fermi’s paradox can be usefully regarded as a boundary value problem. Physical 
theories (with partial exception of theories in quantum cosmology) are conventionally 
represented as a set of dynamical equations describing lawful behaviour of physical 
systems, usually matter fields. This is, of course, not enough, since in order to solve 
specific problems and to be able, consequently, to test the theory against its rivals, we need 
a set of boundary conditions for each specific problem. These can be given in a plethora of 
different ways, but if we wish to investigate evolution of a physical system in time, the 
natural thing to do is to specify initial or final conditions. We have a similar situation in 
astrobiology, mutatis mutandis: we may regard various ways of origin and evolution of 
life and intelligence as subject to (yet unknown) laws of astrobiological dynamics, but we 
still need specific boundary conditions in order to solve the particular problem of 
evolution of extraterrestrial life and intelligence in our Galaxy. Fermi’s paradox tells us 
that whatever the true astrobiological dynamics is, it must be consistent with existence of a 
large region, at present epoch, not filled with intelligent life. How big that region is 
depends on how confident we are in detection capacities of our instruments, but it does not 
influence the general methodological point. Similarly, Olum’s problem refers to the 
boundary conditions in probabilistic sense (it is not overwhelmingly probable that random 
observers will belong to large civilizations at present), and with additional cosmological 
input (spatially infinite universe).    
(II) Finitism. The strategy which we shall not pursue here, but which could present 
a valid methodological point to be made, is that of finitism. If we accept, in accordance 
with Aristotle, that infinities exist only in potential, the limiting process for the fraction of 
observers in small civilizations ( )ssllssV nNnNnN +∞→ /lim , is illegitimate. Here ( )VNs  
and ( )VNl  are numbers of small and large civilizations in the volume V investigated, and 
sn , ln  average numbers of observers per small and large civilization, respectively. 
Instead of having an improbable value of 10-8, as Olum asserts, it would be undefined in a 
similar manner as the infinite series ( )
0
1 1 1 1 1 ...k
k
∞
=
− = − + − +∑  has no convergent sum. This 
finitist view has been defended in more recent times by Dummett among philosophers and 
Brouwer and other intuitionists among mathematicians. Physical cut-off could be 
provided, as Olum mentions, by the existence of cosmological constant which would 
divide the spacetime into causally unconnected parts separated by event horizons. We 
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shall not pursue this strategy here, since it seems less interesting and appealing than the 
evolutionary solution considered below.  
(III) What time is it? “The problem will exist even if we confine ourselves to those 
observers who exist presently.” This reasonable stance implies that we have indexical 
knowledge on the epoch we are living in. This is an important piece of additional data 
which has to be taken into account in the anthropic reasoning. The quoted sentence of 
Olum, for instance, could not be uttered if “presently” were to apply to epochs 
incompatible with the existence of intelligent observers, e.g., the times before galaxy 
formation, or the epoch in our distant future when there is going to be no negentropy 
sources left. Although it sounds quite tame, this simple constraint may, in fact, subtly 
undermine any reasoning, tacitly assuming our understanding of the necessary conditions 
for the existence of observers and civilizations. 
 
 
3. A new solution: taking evolution into account 
 
The devil hides in the details. When Olum writes: “Something must be wrong with our 
understanding of how civilizations evolve if only one in a billion can survive to colonize 
its galaxy,” (Sec. 2.5, emphasis added), he is on the right track. Unfortunately, he doesn’t 
offer a glimpse of what that “wrong” might be. Let us try to fill in the gap here.  
The title of the relevant section of Olum’s paper is “Infinitesimally few 
civilizations become large”. This is an instance of sliding into the Parmenidian timeless 
view so dear to philosophers.1 The correct title would be “Infinitesimally few civilizations 
have become large so far”. There is no inconsistency here. The universe, be it infinite or 
finite, evolves: it changes with cosmic time.2 Platonism has been largely excised from 
modern physical cosmology in mid-1960s after the resolution of the great “cosmological 
controversy” (Kragh 1996) between conflicting paradigms of the Big Bang and the steady-
state cosmologies. What has been a sufficient condition for X at epoch t1, is not 
                                                          
1 Or, in a less merciful Nietzschean term, “mummificationist” view. In a beautiful passage in Twilight of the 
Idols, philosophers are rebuked for “their lack of historical sense, their hatred of even the idea of 
becoming… They think they are doing a thing honor when they dehistoricize it, sub specie aeternitatis – 
when they make a mummy of it.” (Nietzsche 1968, p. 351). 
2 There is a set of necessary conditions for the universal “cosmic time” to be well-defined. They are satisfied 
in all currently favoured cosmological models, and in all inflationary models Olum considers. They are not 
satisfied, for instance, in the celebrated rotating universe of Kurt Gödel (e.g., Stein 1970), which contains 
closed time-like curves.   
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necessarily sufficient at the epoch t2. This is so, on the grounds of principle, but in this 
case we can do even better in specifying changes relevant to our topic.  
There are strong empirical reasons to conclude that the universe has been less 
hospitable to life earlier in its history. One instance of such behaviour is related to the 
chemical enrichment of matter: fewer elements heavier than helium mean a smaller 
probability for the formation of terrestrial planets, and perhaps a smaller probability of 
biochemical processes leading to life, intelligence and observers. This has been recently 
spectacularly quantified by Lineweaver and collaborators who showed that, for instance, 
the median age of Earth-like planets in the Milky Way is 6.4 ± 0.9 billion years; before 
then conditions were far less favourable for the formation of possible life-bearing sites 
(Lineweaver et al. 2004). Another, possibly crucial effect, are catastrophes capable of 
disrupting the evolutionary sequence leading from the simplest prokaryotes to complex 
life, to animals, intelligent beings, and to civilizations, small and large. Notably, it has 
been recently confirmed that gamma-ray bursts detected by satellites in Earth’s orbit at a 
rate of about one per day, are traces of explosions occurring in any galaxy within our 
cosmological horizon (for a review, see e.g., Mészáros 2002). Thus, their occurrence in 
any one particular galaxy (say ours), means a catastrophic event capable of destroying life 
forms in a large part or in the entire galactic habitable zone (Scalo and Wheeler 2002; 
Gonzalez, Brownlee, and Ward 2001). Fortunately enough, we also know from the 
cosmological research that their frequency decreases with cosmic time. Thus, the universe 
becomes more hospitable to life as the time passes.3  
Actually, this seems to be true, for reasons unclear at present, for the Earth 
biosphere as well: Kitchell and Pena (1984) conclude that the extinction risk for species 
has been decreasing with time during the Phanerozoic eon. (Of course, this neglects the 
very recent human activities leading, unfortunately, to the “sixth” mass extinction; e.g., 
Wilson 2003.) Let us call the cumulative effect of all these occurrences the hostility 
parameter. The hostility parameter obviously has its spatial and temporal distribution; and 
these act as Bayesian constraints on any a posteriori estimates of our probability of finding 
ourselves in a large or small civilization.  
Here, as in many other instances, we perceive the insufficiency of gradualism—an 
obsolete XIX century doctrine suggesting that no process occurring in the past was either 
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qualitatively or quantitatively different from its present-day state (cf. Gould 1987). This is 
the same unsupported prejudice which impeded—and in some circles continues to 
impede—our progress in understanding the great mass extinctions of species in Earth’s 
past (Raup 1991, 1994; Ward and Brownlee 2000). The sooner we discard it in the field of 
anthropic reasoning, as well as in astrobiology, the better off we are. 
 Let us take a look at a concrete simple (“toy”) model which provides an illustration 
of this point. Observe a representative volume of space and count N0 habitable sites where 
life and intelligence can develop rapidly.4 Let’s assume that the probability of a small 
civilization becoming a large one, evolves over time as: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]τ/exp10 tptp ll −−= ,      (1) 
  
where t is the cosmic time (measured from some relevant moment, say the galaxy 
formation), τ is the hostility parameter expressed as a characteristic timescale (say for 
gamma-ray burst rarefaction), and 0lp  is the asymptotic “standard” probability—ceteris 
paribus—of a small civilization making the transition to a large one. In Olum’s study, this 
probability is at least 0.1 (since his “timeless” argument assumes that 90% of the currently 
existing civilizations are small ones). 
 In this toy model, the fraction of observers living in a large civilization is, clearly 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
large
0
0 0
number of observers in large civs
total number of observers
number of observers in large civs
number of observers in large civs + number of observers in small civs
1
l l
l l l s
f t
N p t n
N p t n N p t n
= =
= =
= + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
.
     (2) 
 
Here 1910=ln  is the average number of observers in a large civilization, and 1010=sn  
is the average number of observes in a small civilization (using the very same numbers as 
                                                                                                                                                                               
3 Obviously, this tendency will reverse in far future of the universe, with the inexorable rise of entropy 
leading to the state close to the classical “heat death” (e.g., Adams and Laughlin 1997). But the timescale for 
this reversal is many orders of magnitude larger than the timescales of interest here. 
4 This is unrealistic, but is more in agreement with the Olum’s scenario. We shall see below how this 
assumption may also be relativized with respect to the evolution of the universe in time. 
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in Olum’s study). All numbers of observers are taken to be time-dependent, evolving 
quantities. Now, from (1) and (2), after trivial algebraic transformations, we obtain 
 
( )
( ) ( ) sll
l
slll
ll
el
n
tp
n
n
np
t
np
np
tf
ττ /exp1
11
/exp1
1
0
00
0
arg
−−+
≈
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−+
= . (3) 
 
(We neglect here the sl np 0  term as arguably insignificant.) Upon inspection of the last 
expression in (3) we conclude that at least one of the following propositions must be true: 
 
(1) ( ) 1arg ≈tf el ; 
 (2) 00 ≈lp ; or 
 (3) ( ) 1/exp ≈− τt . 
 
The proposition (1) is what Olum finds paradoxical (and corresponds perhaps to his 
solution 2.8, claiming that we are in fact part of a large civilization without been aware of 
that fact5). The proposition (2) corresponds to the idea that infinitesimally few civilizations 
ever become large ones, presumably because of some inherent problem like self-
destruction. This might be valid for some small civilizations, but does not satisfy the non-
exclusivity requirement, as both Olum and many previous investigators of Fermi’s 
paradox concluded. But (3) is something entirely new. Here we have a global evolutionary 
effect acting to impede the formation of large civilizations. It does not clash with any 
observation, as (1) does, nor does it imply something about (arguably nebulous) alien 
sociology, as does (2).   
Of course, our toy model is certainly not realistic. One way of improving it would 
be to perceive that there might be many “critical steps” (Carter 1983; Maynard Smith and 
Szathmary 1997; Knoll and Bambach 2000) in evolving toward a large civilization. Each 
critical step takes some time. For instance, we may envisage the transition from simple life 
to complex life as a step having its own hostility timescale (suppressing and postponing 
“Cambrian explosion analogs” everywhere), and the same for transition between complex 
                                                          
5 Of course, some very weak form of the principle of indifference is necessary here for the said conclusion. 
Nevertheless, this option is quite implausible on other grounds, as Olum points out. 
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life and intelligence, intelligence and small technological civilization, etc. In the simplest 
analogy with the toy model above, we could substitute a single term in the denominator of 
(3) with something like 
 
( )1 .
1
1 exp /
n
i it τ= − −∏       (4) 
 
Clearly, in this case, we would not need to worry about Olum’s problem as long as the 
proposition p 
 
p: (∃i) τi >> t      (5) 
 
is true. It is obvious that p is not true for all times, so at some particular epoch we would 
have to face the problem again. Fortunately enough, that epoch lies in the distant 
cosmological future, so we need not worry about it now.  
 
 
4. Discussion: Too Early to Worry? 
 
By taking into account the physical evolution of the universe and the underlying 
requirements for civilizations (either large or small), we can help resolve the problem, 
pointed out by Olum, in a manner quite in accordance with current tenets of empirical 
astrobiology and anthropic reasoning. In the spirit of Olum’s section/solution 2.10 (“Many 
factors acting together”), we may conclude that global evolutionary effects, in any case, 
constitute a large piece of the ultimate explanation, while local factors, like the loss of 
individuality, would account for the rest. Parenthetically, this argues against mildly 
sensationalistic title of Olum’s paper (“Conflict between anthropic reasoning and 
observation”), since our present observation, incomplete as it is in the astrobiological field, 
should not yet be contraposed with the anthropic reasoning.6 
The solution presented here should not be misconstrued as simplistic assertion that 
seemingly paradoxical situation has not occured yet, in the same sense as a lottery player 
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can assert that a particular number of his has not come up yet. Current astrobiological 
state-of-affairs of our Galaxy is not a sort of a fortuitous state-of-affairs randomly pulled 
from the lottery bowl. Contrariwise, our intention is to emphasize systematic and on the 
average deterministic and predictable evolutionary processes in the physical reality. Such 
processes have precluded (in the probabilistic sense) “paradoxical” states-of-affairs from 
arising so far. Qualification “on the average” is necessary here, since although astronomers 
cannot, for example, predict exactly where and when will a particular supernova or 
gamma-ray burst occur, it is fairly incontroversial that the general trend of decreasing 
frequencies can be inferred on the basis of large observational surveys. 
As we have seen, with increasing time elapsed from the galaxy formation epoch, 
the chance of finding a large civilization gradually increases. In that sense—which is only 
a trivial application of gradualism—we can assert that the universe becomes more 
hospitable to life and intelligence. In the same manner, the problem of conflict between 
anthropic reasoning and observations will become more acute—under the assumption that 
both anthropic reasoning and our observations do not change in future. However, it is 
reasonable to conjecture that our observations regarding this issue are going to change, by 
either discovery of a large civilization in our past light cone, or by becoming a large 
civilization ourselves. However, even under the most optimistic timescales, this is not a 
very pressing concern. (And it can be argued, as well, that the rapid development of 
astrobiology will, by that time, resolve the problem on empirical grounds.) 
We conclude that it is too early (on the cosmological timescale) in the history of 
the universe for a situation to arise which contains Olum’s problem, and that—given the 
present situation—it is too early (on human timescale and in the slightly different sense of 
being premature) to conclude that either astrobiology or our understanding of the 
observation selection conflicts with observation. 
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